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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Margarito Rodriguez appeals from his conviction for sexual abuse of a 
child. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Rodriguez with several crimes related generally to 
sexual abuse of multiple children. (R., pp. 23-28.) Count VI, for sexual abuse of 
a child, alleged that Rodriguez 
did induce, cause or permit S.T. (DOB  a minor child 
under the age of sixteen, to-wit: eight (8) to thirteen (13) years old 
to witness an act of sexual conduct to-wit: the Defendant 
masturbating, with the intent to gratify the lust, passions and/or 
sexual desire of the Defendant, the child, and/or a third party. 
(R., p. 27.) Rodriguez entered a guilty plea to some of the counts, and 
proceeded to trial on others, including Count VI. (R., pp. 136-41.) 
S.T., the alleged victim in Count VI, testified the first day of trial. (R., p. 
151; 7/7/14 Tr., p. 222, Ls. 18-20.) S.T. stated she had no memory of Rodriguez 
masturbating in her presence. (7/7/14 Tr., p. 228, Ls. 5-13. 1) At a later point in 
direct examination, the following exchange took place: 
Q Okay. [S.T.], I talked to you a little bit about the fact that you and 
I had met before, right? 
A Uh-huh. 
1 Rodriguez asserts that S.T. "testified numerous times she had never seen her 
dad, Margarito Rodriguez, masturbate." (Appellant's brief, p. 1 (citing Tr., 228, 
Ls. 5-9).) This statement is inaccurate. S.T. repeatedly said "no" in response to 
questions about whether she remembered seeing Rodriguez masturbate. 
(7/7/14 Tr., p. 228, Ls. 5-13.) 
1 
Q And do you remember when you were talking to me, I asked you 
about any time that you had seen your father masturbate and you 
indicated you remembered one time. Do you remember us talking 
about that? 
A (Shaking head negatively.) 
Q Do you remember talking to me about going to his bedroom and 
opening the door? 
A Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah,yeah. 
Q You were going to ask him a question. 
A Okay, fine. I'm sorry. 
Q [S.T.], let's talk about that incident, okay? 
(7/7/14 Tr., p. 230, L. 22 - p. 231, L. 10.) S.T. then went on to describe an 
incident where she saw Rodriguez with his hands down his shorts. (7/7/14 Tr., p. 
231, L.13-p. 232, L.10.) 
The state also presented a video recording of the charged crime, which 
shows Rodriguez masturbating in front of a different child while S.T. looks into 
the room from the doorway. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 329, L. 19 - p. 331, L. 6; State's 
Exhibit 19.2) S.T.'s aunt testified that, in a confrontation phone call, Rodriguez 
admitted that S.T. "was looking around to see him masturbating." (7/8/14 Tr., p. 
297, L. 19 - p. 298, L. 6.) Upon the conclusion of the trial the jury found 
Rodriguez guilty on two of the three remaining counts, including Count VI. (R., 
pp. 231-32.) 
2 Exhibit 19 was retained by district court. (R., p. 278.) The contents of the video 
are discussed repeatedly in the transcript. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 242, L. 24 - p. 248, L. 
11; p. 306, L. 23- p. 310, L. 12; p. 311, L. 19 - p. 315, L. 24; p. 329, L. 19- p. 
331, L. 6.) The exhibit itself, however, is not in the appellate record. (R., p. 278.) 
2 
The district court entered judgment, including a consecutive sentence of 
10 years with two years determinate on Count VI (R., pp. 258-61.) Rodriguez 
filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 264-66.) 
3 
ISSUES 
Rodriguez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to 
testify during direct examination in violation of Mr. 
Rodriguez's due process rights and right to a fair trial? 
2. Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to 
testify without allowing Mr. Rodriguez to cross examine her 
thereby violating Mr. Rodriguez's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution? 
3. Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to 
engage in misconduct by offering facts not in evidence by 
allowing the detective to give his opinion about what he saw 
on the video, State's Exhibit #19, to the jury? 
4. Did the district court err when it made improper comments 
on the evidence when it admonished the Jury to only 
consider the video and the narrative as it relates to the 
charge against the defendant involving S.T., thereby 
violating Mr. Rodriguez's right to a fair trial before an 
impartial jury? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. During direct examination of S.T. the prosecutor made a representation 
that S.T. had made a statement and then asked if S.T. remembered 
making that statement. Has Rodriguez failed to show fundamental error in 
the form of this question about a prior statement of the witness? 
2. Has Rodriguez failed to show that giving a limiting instruction and 
presenting the Detective's testimony in the form of a prepared statement, 
both of which were done in response to Rodriguez's objection and with his 
approval in response to his successful objection to portions of the video on 




Rodriguez's Objection To The Form Of A Question, Raised For The First Time 
On Appeal. Does Not Rise To The Level Of Fundamental Error 
A. Introduction 
Among the questions the prosecutor asked S.T. during direct examination 
was the following: 
Q And do you remember when you were talking to me, I asked you 
about any time that you had seen your father masturbate and you 
indicated you remembered one time. Do you remember us talking 
about that? 
(7/7/14 Tr., p. 230, L. 25 - p. 231, L. 3.) Rodriguez did not object to this 
question. (7/7/14 Tr., p. 229, L. 23- p. 232, L. 12.) 
For the first time on appeal, Rodriguez claims the "district court erred 
when it allowed the prosecutor to testify." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) Apparently 
conceding that the issue was not preserved by a timely objection, Rodriguez 
argues that the claimed error was fundamental. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-16.) His 
argument fails on all prongs of the applicable fundamental error test. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a defendant fails to timely object at trial, a conviction will be set 
aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant that the 
alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). Review under the fundamental error 
doctrine requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) "one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated"; (2) the constitutional 
5 
error is "clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional 
information" including information "as to whether the failure to object was a 
tactical decision"; and (3) "the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," 
generally by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings." kl at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). 
C. Rodriguez's Argument Fails On All Prongs Of The Fundamental Error Test 
1. There Was No Violation Of A Constitutional Right 
Prosecutorial attempts to "secure a verdict on any factor other than the 
law ... and the evidence admitted during trial ... impacts a defendant's fourteenth 
Amendment right to a fair trial." State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, _, 348 P.3d 
1, 55 (2014). "To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial 
misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the 
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318, 127 P.3d 
212, 221 (Ct. App. 2005). "[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of 
the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 940, 219 (1982). The record shows 
no attempt to secure a verdict on a factor other than the law and admitted 
evidence, much less one of sufficient significance as to result in the denial of a 
fair trial. 
The question at issue was: "And do you remember when you were talking 
to me, I asked you about any time that you had seen your father masturbate and 
you indicated you remembered one time. Do you remember us talking about 
that?" (7/7/14 Tr., p. 230, L. 25 - p. 231, L. 3.) The question here was 
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ultimately, "Do you remember us talking about that?" The preceding sentence, 
"And do you remember when you were talking to me, I asked you about any time 
that you had seen your father masturbate and you indicated you remembered 
one time," set forth the factual premise of the question. Rather than an attempt 
to "secure a verdict on any factor other than ... the evidence," this was merely an 
attempt to elicit testimony about whether S.T. remembered a prior statement. 
Prior statements of a witness may be used for many purposes under our 
rules of evidence. See, ~. I.R.E. 613(a). Surely asking whether a witness 
made a particular statement is a proper question. After she had denied any 
memory of seeing Rodriguez masturbate (7/7/14 Tr., p. 228, Ls. 5-13), 
ascertaining whether S.T. made a statement that she "had seen [Rodriguez] 
masturbate" was entirely legitimate, despite the fact that the prior statement was 
to the prosecutor. Even if objectionable as to its form, 3 the prosecutor's question 
does not rise to a due process violation. 
Rodriguez cites the relevant constitutional standard (Appellant's brief, pp. 
6-7), but spends very little time addressing why it would apply in this case. 
Instead, he argues first for application of I.R.P.C. 3.7 and second for application 
of cases almost uniformly decided on non-constitutional grounds. These 
arguments are irrelevant. Ultimately, Rodriguez's argument relies on two cases 
that are neither controlling law nor persuasive on their facts. 
3 Even under Rodriguez's theory it would have been appropriate for the 
prosecutor in the case to ask a question to the effect, "Did you make a statement 
that you saw Rodriguez masturbate one time?" 
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Rodriguez's first argument, that I.R.P.C. 3.7 "prohibits attorneys from 
testifying in a case in which the attorney is involved" (Appellant's brief, p. 7) fails 
for four reasons: (1) the argument is irrelevant-the rule has no constitutional 
significance; (2) the argument misstates the effect of the rule-the rule does not 
"prohibit[] attorneys from testifying in a case in which the attorney is involved," it 
states an attorney "shall not advocate at a trial" in which she is "likely to be a 
necessary witness"; (3) the rule is inapplicable to the facts of this case because 
the prosecutor was not "likely to be a necessary witness" (and was not even a 
theoretical witness, see I.RE. 613(b) (prior statements may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence)); and (4) the Supreme Court of the United States has 
specifically rejected this sort of analysis, Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 940, 219 
(1982) (due process analysis does not include "culpability of the prosecutor"). 
The argument based on I.R.P.C. 3.7 has no relevance and is presented in what 
appears to be an unseemly and groundless attempt to impugn the ethics of the 
prosecutor, to the unfair prejudice of the state as a party in this appeal. The 
invocation of Rule 3.7 is merely a frivolous attempt to malign the prosecutor, not 
a legal argument, and should be disregarded. 
Rodriguez next relies on cases, which he acknowledges generally do not 
apply constitutional standards. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-13.) The only cases he 
cites for constitutional standards are Dean v. State, 615 S.W.2d 254, 355-56 
(Ark. 1981 ), in which the prosecutor used a question to improperly interject 
inadmissible evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness, and Holt v. 
Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 731, 733-34 (Ky. 2007), where the prosecutor "put 
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the very words [the witness] refused to say in his mouth" in a long and extensive 
examination. Even accepting these cases for their substantive statements of the 
law,4 these cases are not persuasive because the facts in this case do not come 
close to the facts in those cases. 
For example, in Dean, the prosecutor's question improperly submitted an 
expert finding that the defendant was a future threat of harm, evidence that itself 
was inadmissible and highly prejudicial. In this case evidence regarding S.T.'s 
prior statement was admissible. In Holt, the prosecutor repeatedly told a witness 
that the defendant had confessed to the crime, but there was no evidence 
actually presented to support that claim. In this case there was a video of the 
crime happening in live action. In short, in this case the prosecutor, even if the 
form of her question was objectionable, did not interject any incurable error that 
deprived Rodriguez of a fair trial, 5 and therefore Rodriguez has failed to show 
any due process violation. 
Rodriguez also argues that the prosecutor's question violated his right to 
confrontation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-19.) This argument is specious. The 
Confrontation Clause prevents the government from using evidence of out-of-
court testimonial statements unless the declarant is unavailable and the 
defendant has had the prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. 
4 The decisions are clearly not binding on Idaho courts. See, ~. State v. Terry, 
98 Idaho 285, 286, 561 P.2d 1318, 1319 (1977) (reviewing out-of-state authority 
as persuasive but non-binding). 
5 The question of whether the trial was fair is discussed in greater detail under the 
prejudice prong, below. 
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Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004); State v. Shackelford, 155 Idaho 454, 460, 
314 P.3d 136, 143 (2013). The prosecutor's question was not an out-of-court 
testimonial statement, but instead an in-court question by counsel regarding an 
out-of-court statement by the witness on the stand (and subject to cross-
examination). A request to place the prosecutor under oath so that she could 
testify about the witness interview-and thus transform a mere question into 
evidence subject to cross-examination-would not have been a viable or proper 
objection. To the extent the question was objectionable, the grounds for 
objection were not that the question was not admissible evidence absent the 
opportunity for cross-examination. 
Rodriguez has failed to show the first prong of the fundamental error test, 
as he has failed to show a due process violation or an infringement on his 
confrontation rights. 
2. The Claimed Error Is Not Plain On The Record, Nor Is It Plain That 
The Lack Of An Objection Was Not Tactical 
As shown above, improper questions by a prosecutor rarely have been 
found to rise to the level of being due process violations. Rodriguez has failed to 
establish that the record shows a clear attempt to secure a verdict on a factor 
other than the law and admissible evidence, much less one that rendered the trial 
fundamentally unfair. The prosecutor's question simply did not create a 
substantial risk that the jury would return its verdict on factors other than the 
evidence, much less clearly do so. 
Moreover, the question, even if improper, was minimally prejudicial and 
easily curable, if not actually cured by the general instruction that statements by 
10 
the lawyers were not evidence. (R., p. 198.) Under this record, Rodriguez's trial 
counsel could very well have simply decided it was not worth an objection. While 
cross-examining S.T. Rodriguez's counsel in fact used the exact same tactic 
Rodriguez claims the prosecutor improperly employed: 
Q I just have just briefly just a couple questions. Do you remember 
being interviewed by Mrs. Perry after the police came? She worked 
with the Nampa Family Justice Center. She interviewed you and 
your sister [Y.R.] and I believe [B.T.] as well? 
A No, I don't remember Perry. 




(7/7/14 Tr., p. 232, L. 22 - p. 233, L. 6.) Employing Rodriguez's appellate 
analysis, Rodriguez's trial counsel "testified" that one Mrs. Perry with the Nampa 
Family Justice Center interviewed S.T. and two other children in this case. 
Clearly, no one at the trial thought this tactic of proposing factual scenarios and 
then asking questions about those scenarios merited objection or judicial 
intervention. 
Finally, Rodriguez has failed to show that counsel would or should have 
raised the objections he raises for the first time on appeal. It is far more likely 
that if trial counsel had elected to object, he would have objected to the form of 
the question on grounds provided by the Idaho Rules of Evidence rather than 
asserting a due process or confrontation violation. Moreover, S.T.'s testimony 
was primarily that she did not remember relevant events, especially any 
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masturbation. Declining to make a constitutional objection that might either call 
attention to the prosecutor's statement or cause a mistrial where the victim's 
testimony was arguably more helpful to the defense than the prosecution was 
within the range of appropriate tactical decisions. It is not clear on this record 
that counsel did not make a tactical choice to not raise a due process or 
confrontation objection. 
Rodriguez has failed to show that the alleged error in the form of the 
prosecutor's question clearly rises to the level of being a due process or a 
confrontation violation. Moreover, he has failed to show that counsel did not 
reasonably forego objecting on constitutional grounds. The record does not 
show a clear error. 
3. Rodriguez Has Failed To Show Prejudice 
To the extent the question was improper, it ultimately did not rise to the 
level of denying Rodriguez's due process right to a fair trial. First, the district 
court instructed the jury that it was to base its verdict on the evidence, and that 
the statements of the lawyers were not evidence. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 349, L. 13 - p. 
350, L. 5; R., p. 198.) Second, Rodriguez had ample opportunity to cross-
examine S.T., and in fact elicited testimony that S.T. denied ever seeing 
Rodriguez masturbate at an interview prior to when she talked to the prosecutor. 
(7/7/14 Tr., p. 232, L. 22 - p. 233, L. 6.) Her testimony, that she had no memory 
of seeing Rodriguez masturbate, was adequately addressed and vetted at trial. 
Finally, the state presented a video recording of Rodriguez masturbating in front 
12 
of S.T. (Exhibit 19.6) To show error, therefore, Rodriguez would have to show 
that the jury ignored its instructions, considered the question as evidence, and 
rendered a different verdict than it would have based on the other evidence, 
which included a video of the act in question. Rodriguez has failed to make this 
showing. 
Rodriguez argues that the district court's correct instructions that "opening 
statements are not evidence" (7/7/14 Tr., p. 168, L. 25) and "you must decide the 
case only on the evidence received here in court" (7/7/14 Tr., p. 179, Ls. 15-17) 
somehow "empowered the jury" to conclude the prosecutor's question was 
evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp. 14-15.) Rodriguez's already implausible 
argument fails to mention the instruction that "statements by lawyers" in "opening 
statements, closing statement and at other times" are "not evidence." (7/8/14 Tr., 
p. 349, Ls. 21-25.) Rodriguez has cherry-picked the instructions to present a 
misleading argument. 
Rodriguez also argues that a jury question-whether "inducing, causing or 
permitting opportunity to witness" a sexual act (R., p. 230)-somehow 
demonstrates prejudice. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) The jury instructions, to 
which the district court referred the jury in answer to their question, clearly stated 
that to find Rodriguez guilty, the jury must find proved beyond a reasonable 
6 Exhibit 19 is not in the record on appeal. (R., pp. 278-79.) It must be presumed 
to support the verdict. See State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 
1352 (Ct. App. 1992) (missing portions of the record are presumed to support the 
actions of the court below); State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 823, 992 P .2d 
1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999) (in the absence of an adequate record on appeal, the 
appellate court will not presume error). 
13 
doubt that Rodriguez "induced, caused or permitted S.T. (DOB: to 
witness an act of sexual conduct." (R., p. 217; see 7/8/14 Tr., p. 382, Ls. 3-5.) 
Nothing in the question or answer indicated that the jury improperly considered 
the prosecutor's question to be evidence. 
Rodriguez's argument fails to acknowledge a jury instruction to not 
consider statements by the prosecutor to be evidence, and ignores the evidence 
actually presented at trial (and not supplied on appeal). Because he has simply 
failed to acknowledge the most significant parts of the record, Rodriguez has 
failed to show prejudice. 
11. 
Rodriguez Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Limiting Instruction 
And Testimony Regarding Exhibit 19 
A. Introduction 
Rodriguez claims that Detective Bryant's testimony regarding Exhibit 19 
and the court's instruction limiting jury consideration of inadmissible parts of the 
video constitute fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-29.) The record, 
however, shows that these were specific steps taken at trial, in response to 
Rodriguez's objections, to prevent prejudice from parts of the video showing a 
crime other than Count VI. Rodriguez's claim of fundamental error is specious. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellant claiming error for the first time on appeal must establish all 
three elements of fundamental error: (1) violation of an unwaived constitutional 
right; (2) that the constitutional error is clear on the record and that the failure to 
14 
object was not tactical; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). 
C. Review Of The Record Shows That Rodriguez's Claim Of Fundamental 
Error Is Specious 
After the jury was selected, the district court took up evidentiary issues, 
including the admissibility of Exhibit 19, a video showing Rodriguez masturbating 
before two children. (7/7/14 Tr., p. 158, L. 12 - p. 162, L. 20.) Rodriguez 
objected to the video on the basis that the recording related primarily to one of 
the counts Rodriguez pied guilty to, and the exhibit was therefore unfairly 
prejudicial on Count VI. (7/7/14 Tr., p. 160, Ls. 8-19.) The state argued it was 
admissible as it was a recording of the actual crime. (7/7/14 Tr., p. 160, L. 25 -
p. 161, L. 8.) The court preliminarily ruled that the portion of the exhibit where 
S.T. was present was admissible. (7/7/14 Tr., p. 162, Ls. 15-20; p. 163, L. 20 -
p. 164, L. 14.) 
On the second day of trial, before Exhibit 19 had been admitted or 
presented to the jury, Rodriguez's counsel again expressed concerns about the 
exhibit on the basis of S.T.'s testimony, which did not establish that she saw 
Rodriguez masturbating. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 242, L. 24 - p. 243, L. 10.) The 
prosecutor represented that the state would be able to lay foundation that it was 
in fact S.T. in the video. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 243, Ls. 11-22.) The district court 
overruled the objection on the condition that the state present adequate 
foundation that the child in the video was S.T. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 243, L. 23 - p. 246, 
L. 1 O; p. 246, L. 20 - p. 248, L. 1.) 
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Rodriguez also objected that the video might be prejudicial because there 
was potential for confusion as to which child in the video was the charged victim. 
(7/8/14 Tr., p. 246, Ls. 11-19.) The court asked if there would be "a narrative to 
the video" to reduce potential confusion as to which child the state was focusing 
on in the exhibit. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 248, Ls. 2-7.) The prosecutor stated her intent to 
have the detective "describe what happens in the video and then play the video 
so the jury knows what they're looking for." (7/8/14 Tr., p. 248, Ls. 8-11.) 
The state called Detective Bryant in its case-in-chief. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 316, 
Ls. 5-6.7) Before he testified, however, the district court again addressed the 
admission of Exhibit 19, and ruled that it would give a limiting instruction before 
the video was played. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 306, Ls. 1-20.) It requested an offer of 
proof regarding the detective's testimony in regard to the exhibit. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 
306, L. 23 - p. 307, L. 1.) The prosecutor provided the requested offer, including 
intent to have the detective "describe that video and the contents of the video up 
until the redaction." (7/8/14 Tr., p. 307, L. 2 - p. 308, L. 8.) The court then 
solicited the defense position. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 308, Ls. 9-11.) Defense counsel 
stated he was "okay with" the detective providing a narrative that describes the 
video. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 308, Ls. 12-15; see also Ls. 16-18.) Defense counsel also 
stated no objection to the court's proposed limiting instruction, save to suggest 
using S.T.'s actual name instead of her initials. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 309, Ls. 19-25.) 
7 On appeal Rodriguez claims Detective Bryant was called in rebuttal. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 21.) The record shows this claim to be false. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 
316, Ls. 5-6 (Detective Bryant called); p. 333, Ls. 2-3 (the state rests); p. 335, Ls. 
21-23 (defense rests without calling witnesses).) 
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The district court then requested that the state present the narration and 
the redacted exhibit prior to the jury being brought back into court. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 
310, Ls. 7-24.) The prosecution presented the detective's narration: 
Q All right. Can you please read into the record the description 
of video V _20, I'm sorry, 00204.3G2. 
A Yes. The video begins. It's facing -
COURT: And that's contained in Exhibit 19. 
MS. KALLIN: That's Exhibit 19, yes. 
WITNESS: The video begins. It's facing a shut door with some 
towels happening on the back of the door. Part of the camera itself 
is blocked by what appears to be a towel. There's a male in a white 
and red striped shirt who is naked from the waist down and he's 
seen pulling on his penis and then walks around and is looking 
back at the camera. 
His hand and his penis is visible and he's masturbating. He 
repeatedly puts spit on his penis. He moves to the other side of the 
room and appears to be masturbating but his hand and his penis is 
not visible at that time. The male opens the door and appears to 
motion towards someone. Begins masturbating again. 
He moves away from the door and a girl walks in and sets 
what appears to be a pair of scissors on the desk and immediately 
leaves. The male opens the door wider. The girl comes back in and 
then leaves and then is called back in again. 
The male continues to masturbate and then another girl's 
head is visible behind the first girl. And the male continues to 
masturbate. 
MS. KALLIN: That will be the extent of the summary that would be 
played, Your Honor. 
(7/8/14 Tr., p. 311, L. 14 - p. 312, L. 16 (verbatim).) The prosecutor then played 
the redacted exhibit. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 313, Ls. 8-12.) 
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After this offer of proof the parties entered a stipulation helping clarify 
which girl in the video was not S.T. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 313, L. 18 - p. 315, L. 16.) 
This stipulation was incorporated by the district court into its limiting instruction. 
(7/8/14 Tr., p. 329, Ls. 5-6.) 
Detective Bryant testified as a witness, and the prosecutor notified the 
court prior to submitting Exhibit 19. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 328, Ls. 21-22.) The district 
court then gave the jury its limiting instruction. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 328, L. 23 - p. 329, 
L. 6.) The prosecutor introduced the narrative regarding what the video showed. 
(7/8/14 Tr., p. 329, L. 19 - p. 330, L. 16.) Exhibit 19 was then admitted and 
shown to the jury. (7/8/14 Tr., p. 330, L. 23 - p. 331, L. 6.) 
On appeal, Rodriguez first claims it was "prosecutorial misconduct" 
amounting to fundamental error to "allow[] the [sic] Detective Bryant to give his 
opinion, through a prepared summary, about what he saw on Exhibit 19, (the 
video), to the jury." (Appellant's brief, p. 21 (commas and parentheses original).) 
Specifically, he claims that Detective Bryant's testimony "shifted the burden of 
[proof]," and "contains factual assertions fundamental to Mr. Rodriguez's 
guilt/innocence [sic]." (Appellant's brief, p. 23.) Rodriguez's argument that the 
prosecution committed fundamental error by presenting admissible evidence to 
the jury is specious. Moreover, the detective presented testimony in the form of 
a summary in specific response to Rodriguez's prejudice objection, an action 
Rodriguez's counsel specifically endorsed. 
Rodriguez next claims that the district court committed fundamental error 
by giving the instruction limiting the jury's consideration to the admissible 
18 
components of Exhibit 19. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-29.) Rodriguez's argument 
that the court erred by instructing the jury to not consider evidence it had ruled 
inadmissible in response to Rodriguez's objection is also specious. 
No constitutional right was even implicated, much less violated by the 
procedure used to implement the court's ruling sustaining Rodriguez's objection 
to the video; any constitutional objection was waived when trial counsel endorsed 
the procedure ultimately used; the claimed error is far from "clear" in the record; 
and there was no prejudice. The record in this case shows Rodriguez's claim of 
fundamental error is specious. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction. 
DATED this 5th day of November, 2015. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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